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Cock-eyed Optimist Meets Chicken Little: 
Jack Balkin on the American Future* 
Sanford Levinson** 
	Given that we are close friends and the co-authors of some twenty 
articles and a book, Democracy and Dysfunction,1 it is not surprising that I 
think very highly of and agree with much of Jack Balkin’s new book, The 
Cycles of Constitutional Time.2   I read it in two sittings; it is a real page-
turner, written with brio as Jack presents a remarkably comprehensive 
overview of what he discerns as various cycles in American politics 
(importantly including the Supreme Court and the development of 
constitutional doctrine) from the beginning of the new national government in 
1789 to the present.3  It is a book to be savored and studied, particularly with 
regard to the interplay of his three analytically separable cycles, dealing, 
respectively, with the developments of the party system that structures so 
much of our politics; polarization; and the role played by the federal judiciary 
– or, more particularly, the Supreme Court – in trying to adjudicate or control 
some of the implications of the first two.  It is also, inevitably, a book to argue 
with.  
For me, the central question is whether Jack ultimately has a tragic or a 
comic view of our constitutional saga.  Will there be bodies strewn all over 
the stage at the end of the play, or will there be whatever might be the modern 
equivalent of a “constitutional marriage,” with smiles all around and stories 
 
* This was originally drafted for a symposium on Balkinization on Jack’s book, 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/09/cock-eyed-optimist-meets-chicken-little.html.  I 
have revised it a bit, in part to take account of the obvious fact that an election 
intervened between the symposium in September 2020, and the truly wonderful 
symposium on the book that took place, albeit virtually, at the University of Missouri 
School of Law on November 12-13.  And, as these final revisions are being written on 
January 6, 2021, it is impossible not to take account of what occurred following the 
New Year, including the election in Georgia.  I am extremely grateful to Paul Litton 
and others who organized the symposium and provided gracious Zoom hospitality on 
the occasion, as well as to the editors of the Missouri Law Review for making sure that 
the collective comments will be available in this one place.    
** W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, 
University of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at 
Austin 
1. SANFORD LEVINSON & JACK M. BALKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DYSFUNCTION 
(2019); JACK M. BALKIN, THE CYCLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL TIME (2020). 
2. JACK M. BALKIN, THE CYCLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL TIME (2020). 
3. Id. 
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as to how the now-happy country surmounted a variety of challenges and 
travails to achieve their happy ending?  Jack, I believe, has an ultimately 
comedic view.  He forthrightly states, both at the beginning of the book and 
again at the end, that for all of the justified depression we might feel at the 
present moment about the health of our constitutional order – during which, 
for example, I have posted suggestions that the preferable alternative to the 
incipient civil war is peaceful dissolution of the United States – it is ultimately 
only the darkness before a brighter dawn.4  It might take quite a while for us 
to dig our way out of the multiple problems facing us today – including what 
I regard his most important analytical contribution, the notion of 
“constitutional rot” (about which more anon) – but do not lose hope.  Thus, 
the concluding words of the book: 
The problems of American democracy will not be cured overnight, or 
even in a decade.  Constitutional rot is a stubborn condition; emerging 
from it will be a painful process.  The good news is that the cycles of 
constitutional time are slowly turning.  Politics is re-forming.  The 
elements of renewal are available to us, if we have the courage to use 
them.5 
 From the moment that Professor Litton introduced Jack at the Missouri 
Law Review symposium, a great deal of emphasis was placed on the “hope” 
he articulated and, therefore, engendered in his sympathetic readers.  Perhaps 
this was more true if one read it before the election, when it appeared – and I 
think Jack himself anticipated – a resounding repudiation not only of Donald 
J. Trump, which one can argue did in fact happen, but also of the 
contemporary Republican Party that had acquiesced in its service as Trump’s 
enablers.  If one wishes to be even harsher, many of his Republican supporters 
might well have been described, in Lenin’s term, as as “useful idiots” willing 
to contribute their stature to endorsing modes of political conduct that one 
suspected they had qualms about, or even detested, in private.   
The latter repudiation did not occur.  Quite remarkably, Republicans 
picked up seats in the House of Representatives, leaving Nancy Pelosi with 
the smallest majority of any recent Speaker.6  And Republicans, even after 
Georgia’s remarkable election on January 5, 2021, retain half the seats in the 
Senate, losing their majority only because Vice President Harris will be 
spending far more time at the Capitol than she probably envisioned in order 
 
4. Id. at 65, 173. 
5. Id. at 174.   
6. Allan Smith, Pelosi Wins Re-Election as House Speaker with Slim Majority, 
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to break tie votes.7  Moreover, former University of Missouri School of Law 
Professor Josh Hawley, a product of Stanford and the Yale Law School, has 
lent himself to collaborating with Trump’s most demagogic and anti-
democratic (and not only anti-Democratic) fantasies about non-existent 
“frauds” that deprived Trump of the majority support he delusionally believes 
was his.8  As the Kansas City Star has written, Hawley has “blood on his 
hands”9 with regard to his de facto legitimation of the attempted coup that 
occurred at the Capitol on January 6, 2021.   That he surely did not “intend” 
those events is equivalent to the claim of a callow child whose playing with 
matches set off a forest fire.  And even though Mitch McConnell will become 
the Minority Leader in the Senate on January 20, when Harris takes office, he 
will, unless Democrats actually abolish the filibuster on all legislation, be able 
to stymie President Biden in much the same way that he did, even without a 
Senate majority, during most of President Obama’s tenure in office.10  One 
reason that the filibuster, even if somewhat modified, may survive, in addition 
to West Virginia Senator Joe Manchin’s opposition to eliminating it, is that it 
is not clear that Biden, nostalgic for a Senate that no longer exists, would 
support such a clearly polarizing decision.  Still, even if Jack is somewhat 
chastened, he does remain the optimist, apparently full of faith that the United 
States will pull out of its Trumpian tailspin. 
I am less optimistic.  Within our partnership, which has been central to 
my intellectual life for at least three decades, I suppose I have become 
Chicketn Little to his sometimes cockeyed optimist.  So my contribution to 
this symposium, beyond urging everyone to read and grapple with Jack’s 
interesting and fully accessible meditation on the past and current state of 
American politics, is to cast some doubt on his relative optimism.  I was 
skeptical prior to the election; I am even more so now, whatever my elation 
that Donald J. Trump is out of office and Mitch McConnell relegated to being 
only the Minority Leader.   
Given Jack’s time horizon, he is not really trying to reassure me that 
things will necessarily get better in my lifetime, as I am completing my eighth 
decade of life.  Rather, his reassurance is that my children and, more certainly, 
 
7. Id. 
8. Dan Zak, What Does Josh Hawley Think He’s Doing?, THE WASHINGTON 
POST (Jan. 17, 2021, 5:00 AM) https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/josh-
hawley-missouri-senator-trump-election-fraud/2021/01/16/2fed38a6-55e4-11eb-
a817-e5e7f8a406d6_story.html [https://perma.cc/4GPY-TJGJ]. 
9. Assault on Democracy: Sen. Josh Hawley Has Blood on His Hands in Capitol 
Coup Attempt, THE KANSAS CITY STAR (Jan. 6, 2021), 
https://www.kansascity.com/opinion/editorials/article248317375.html. 
10. David Horsey, Georgia On Our Minds, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 23, 2020, 
8:57 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/georgia-on-our-minds/ 
[https://perma.cc/2YZU-BCK7]. 
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my grandchildren may have reason to look forward to sunnier futures 
(defined, among other ways, by the return to more-or-less hegemonic power, 
for at least a while, of the Democratic Party).  For obvious reasons, I hope that 
I am wrong and Jack is right.  However, I am not convinced and will not be 
so even after Joe Biden takes the oath of office.11  Even if, as now (August, 
2021) appears to be the case, he is willing to think boldly and even 
“transformatively,” will he take the lead in suggesting that we need a long-
overdue national conversation about constitutional reform if we are serious 
about curing our “rot”?  The answer, I am afraid, is no.  Even if Biden is truly 
audacious in terms of policy proposals, he would still need to confront the 
extent to which we are all imprisoned in an iron cage, constructed by the 
Framers of 1787, from which we desperately need to escape. 
So let’s talk about “rot.”  What is it?  “It is,” says Jack, “the decay of the 
features of a constitutional system that maintain it both as a democracy and as 
republic.”12  A “democracy” presumably is defined by the degree to which it 
reflects the actual preferences of the demos, sometimes with reference to the 
“median voter.”13  When a system in fact systematically honors the 
preferences of others, who will invariably be only a minority of the overall 
public, it is not a “democracy.”  And Jack presents good reason to believe that 
we are indeed in such a situation. We live far more in an “oligarchy,” where 
money not only talks but screams with delight as the wishes of the donor class 
are translated into concrete political victories.14  This is especially notable in 
Republican administrations, as with the obscenity of the Trump “tax cut,”15 
but also, if truth be known, in the more-or-less “neo-liberal” administrations 
of both Bill Clinton and Barack Obama – where the well-off became even 
better off, even if there were also some efforts, as with the Earned Income Tax 
 
11. I am making my final editorial corrections on August 15, 2021, at which 
time Joseph Biden has been in office for more than six months.  To be sure, I am 
pleasantly surprised by the early days of the Biden Administration and his apparent 
willingness to “think big.”  But, to put it mildly, it is still altogether unclear that 
Congress will be able (and willing) to pass any bold legislation that does not fit within 
the constraints of the byzantine “reconciliation” process, including, for example, any 
pre-emption of egregious efforts to suppress votes in the 2022 election and thereafter.   
12. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 44.  
13. H. Clay Jent, Demos Kratos: Democracy, Old and New, THE SOCIAL 
STUDIES 58, 242 (2015). 
14. An oligarchy is a government by the few, in which a small group exercises 
control especially for corrupt and selfish purposes. “Oligarchy.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
ONLINE DICTIONARY (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/oligarchy [https://perma.cc/6GUW-BD3J]. 
15. Kimberly Amadeo, Trump’s Tax Plan and How It Affects You, THE 
BALANCE (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/trump-s-tax-plan-how-it-
affects-you-4113968 [https://perma.cc/D5CM-KUS5]. 
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Credit or Obamacare,16 to pay at least some attention to the plight of those 
seen by Mitt Romney in 2012 as “the takers” rather than the “makers” who 
deserved to hoard any economic gains.  Of course, there is the reality that the 
Constitution was designed by people who were profoundly antagonistic to the 
notion of “democracy”; that would require some genuine faith in the capacity 
of ordinary people to engage in what Federalist No. 1 described as “reflection 
and choice” about how we should in fact be governed.17  Inasmuch as the 
Framers did whatever they could to assure that we would live within the 
confines of a significantly “undemocratic Constitution,” it is not clear what it 
means to say that our present situation represents a “decay” rather than, for 
some at least, the realization of their hopes.   
After all, Federalist No. 63, written by Madison, goes out of its way to 
note with pride that a Constitution ordained in the name of “We the People” 
in fact deprived the actual public of any direct role whatsoever in their 
governance.18  Everything would in fact be done by ostensible 
“representatives” of the public – some directly elected, as with the House of 
Representatives (though with a quite truncated electorate, of course), and 
some indirectly so, as with the original members of the Senate until the 
passage of the 17th Amendment in 1913, and, notoriously, the President of 
the United States, selected through the mechanism of the truly egregious 
electoral college.  Moreover, in Federalist No. 78, beloved by most lawyers 
because it is a defense of the importance of the Supreme Court in maintaining 
the rule of law, Hamilton’s chief worry, regarding what we might be tempted 
to call a “discrete and insular minority,” is the fate of the eighteenth century 
version of the well-off, whether one percent or even the top ten percent.19  The 
point is that they would be fearful of the redistributive inclinations of the hefty 
remainder of the public.   
There are always more have-nots than haves in any political order.  At 
times, there has been a welcome development of a strong middle class and 
diminution of plutocratic power.  But, as Jack so well notes, there is nothing 
inevitable about that.  He argues convincingly that we are currently living 
through a second Gilded Age – the first occurred after the failure of the “new 
birth of freedom” promised by Lincoln in the Gettysburg Address – featuring 
the same kinds of grotesque economic inequalities and the successful capture 
of our formal political system by a rapacious economic class devoted to 
enhancing its class privileges.20   But Jack is also concerned about the health 
 
16. Tax Policy Center Briefing Book: Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System, TAX 
POLICY CENTER, 2020,  https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-earned-
income-tax-credit [https://perma.cc/5DMS-PF8R].  
17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton). 
18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison). 
19. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
20. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 45. 
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of what the Constitution specifies as our “Republican Form of 
Government.”  What does this mean?  “A republic,” he writes, “is more than 
a representative form of government.  It is a joint enterprise by citizens and 
their representatives to pursue and promote the public good.”21  It requires an 
internal set of dispositions, where people are genuinely willing and able to 
subordinate their self-interest to pursuit instead of “the public good.”  One is 
reminded of seventeenth-century voters’ oaths, where the members of the 
community pledged to think only of what would be best for the community at 
large rather than their own particular interests.  This is the deep meaning of 
the fact, for example, that four of the American states – Massachusetts, 
Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky (originally, of course, part of Virginia) 
– styled themselves as “commonwealths,” i.e., communities organized around 
the seeking of a common good.22  Constitutional rot occurs when “public 
servants are increasingly diverted into the pursuit of their own wealth, or when 
they are increasingly diverted into serving the interest of a relatively small 
number of very powerful individuals,”23 as against being committed to “the 
public good.”              
In my book Framed, I delineated what I called the “Madisonian 
anxiety,” spelled out most clearly in the famed Federalist No. 10, where 
Madison acknowledged, as the Protestant he was, that we are all ineluctably 
selfish and thus prone to prefer our own interests, whether economic gain or 
the triumph of our own religious sectarianism over those who are classified as 
“heretics” or otherwise “ungodly.”24  Was there a solution?  Is a “republican” 
society – organized around the quest for a common good that will be sought 
by suitably socialized citizens – destined to become a distinctly more “liberal” 
order that accepts the priority of individual interests and the psychology 
associated with self-seeking?  In an exchange with Professor Bowman 
following my presentation, I suggested that one important form of what might 
be described as “legal liberalism” is that set out by Oliver Wendell Holmes in 
his conceptualization of actual persons as completely egoistic “bad men” 
concerned only with maximizing individual utilities.25  To be sure, one can 
read him only as offering a useful heuristic for defining the nature of a legal 
system, but I think it is also the case that Holmes’s suggestion has become 
part and parcel of the legal culture as transmitted in our law schools, where 
 
21. Id. at 44.   
22. “Commonwealth.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (Feb. 5, 2021), 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/commonwealth 
[https://perma.cc/577K-4W66]. 
23. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 45.   
24. SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S FIFTY-ONE CONSTITUTIONS AND 
THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE (2012); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
25. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 
(1897).  . 
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students are invited to think of their clients as trying to maximize their own 
interests and the lawyer as having a concomitant duty to provide “zealous 
representation” on their behalf.  And I suspect this is especially true as one 
moves away from small towns and genuinely personal lawyering into the 
world of large law firms and younger lawyers who are likely never in fact to 
meet individual clients.   
In any event, I read Madison as offering the quite implausible hope that 
the new Constitution can endure as a “republican” order by limiting the power 
of “we the people” and hoping for rule by virtuous political elites.  In the 
Madisonian vision, one way of identifying these elites, presumably, is through 
their willingness to be independent of factional party interests.  Why should 
one expect this to alleviate Madison’s anxiety?  It is because, for reasons left 
almost completely unexplained, he believes that voters for, say, the House of 
Representatives – the one branch of the national government in which “the 
people” will play any role at all – will vote for enlightened elites who will use 
their powers not to pursue the interests of their selfish constituents, but rather 
to achieve the “public good.”  The Senate, of course, was to be selected by 
state legislatures, and the president by electors who, we were solemnly 
promised in Federalist No. 68, would protect us against demagogues by using 
their discretion to select only truly trustworthy leaders.26  (The Supreme 
Court, of course, paid absolutely no attention to Hamilton’s assurances in 
deciding in July of 2020 that electors could actually be turned into mindless 
minions of whoever voted them into office, the one example at the national 
level of fully “instructed” delegates instead of at least partial “trustees” for the 
public good.)  
For better or worse, though, the Madisonian hope empirically failed only 
shortly after the Constitution went into operation with Washington’s 
inauguration in 1789.27  The only debate among serious historians is whether 
the American party system had developed by 1795 and the presidential 
election of 1796, or whether it took until the extraordinarily bitter election of 
1800 and near-civil war when Federalists were tempted to deny the presidency 
to Thomas Jefferson as a result of the tie vote between Jefferson and Aaron 
Burr, his ostensible running mate.28  No one could seriously believe that either 
political parties or polarization are a development only in our own times.  The 
more serious problem, in a way, altogether relevant to Jack’s really fine book, 
is our difficulty today in supplying any convincing meaning to the term 
“public good” (save in the economists’ sense of a particular kind of good that 
cannot in fact be distributed through a market price because there is no way 
 
26 .THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton). 
27. George Washington’s First Inaugural Address (April 30, 1789). 
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to limit beneficiaries of, say, a dam or a national defense system only to those 
who pay a relevant fee).   
The Democratic Party in particular has been based for at least the past 
seventy-five years on what came to be described as “interest-group 
liberalism,”29 a collection of groups, sometimes in conflict with one another 
– the famed “big tent” until the 1960s of white Southern segregationists and 
urban Black politicians like Adam Clayton Powell – who would, nonetheless, 
all receive the benefits accruing from various “tax and spend” programs 
endorsed by the New Deal and Democratic presidents who governed in 
Roosevelt’s wake.  In his famed Preface to Democratic Theory, the great 
political scientist Robert Dahl ridiculed the notion of a public interest, 
replacing it by drawing our attention to the fact that any political party is 
necessarily an uneasy coalition of groups pursuing their own often conflicting 
notions of welfare.30  Perhaps if one shares the optimism of Bernard 
Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees or Adam Smith's notion of “the invisible 
hand,” then it will turn out, as Mandeville famously asserted, that out of the 
pursuit of private vice will magically emerge “the public benefit.”31  To put it 
mildly, I doubt that many of Jack’s likely readers, whether democrats or 
Democrats, are so optimistic today.  And by the end of his life, Dahl himself 
had repudiated much of the relative optimism of his earlier vision of a 
benignly pluralistic polity.  Indeed, toward the end of his life, he 
authored How Democratic is the American Constitution?32  And the answer 
was, most certainly, that it was insufficiently so, to the detriment of our actual 
polity.  Much earlier, at the end of the 1960s, Cornell political scientist Ted 
Lowi had published The End of Liberalism,33 where he castigated the shallow 
political theory underlying interest group liberalism, not least because it 
appeared to rely for implementation on open-ended delegation to the 
executive branch.  Craven legislators could tell their constituents that they had 
supported programs in their interest while at the same time leaving it up to 
more-or-less unaccountable administrators to make the genuine discretionary 
decisions that could literally determine, on occasion, who shall live and who 
shall die.  He suggested that we had transitioned to a distinctly different form 
 
29. Theodore J. Lowi, The Public Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism, 
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 5, 18 (1967).   
30. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956). 
31. BERNARD MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES: OR, PRIVATE VICES, 
PUBLICK BENEFITS (1988); Emma Rothschild, Adam Smith and the Invisible Hand, 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, May 1994, 319. 
32. ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 
(2002) 
33. THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1979). 
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of “republic,” and he was not happy about it.34  But both mainstream political 
science and legal academics agreed that almost nothing useful could actually 
be said about what governance in “the public good” might actually look 
like.  Or, should we seek guidance, some legal academics suggested it would 
come from the collective wisdom of the Warren Court.  Even Alexander 
Bickel, before he lost his faith in the judiciary, commended the judiciary as 
the privileged enunciator of our “fundamental values” and, therefore, what 
presumably united us as a singular people with certain transcendent 
commitments.35  Jack does not appear to accept such an exalted view of the 
Court or of those who serve on it. 
An exceptionally interesting chapter, about the cycles of judicial time, 
draws a clear contrast between the relative “depolarization” that existed in the 
otherwise disorderly 1960s and the belief, now regarded as near-delusionary, 
that elite lawyers and judges, especially if trained in the “legal process” school 
of Henry Hart and Albert Sachs and exported to Yale by Bickel, could achieve 
“settlement” of the issues that might otherwise appear to be insoluble, 
including race relations (see Brown)36 or what exactly “representative 
government” might really entail (see Baker v. Carr37 and then Reynolds v. 
Sims38).39  And even the sexual revolution could be handled, as 
with Griswold and then Roe.40  Presumably, serious people – two of them 
trained at Harvard, the third at Stanford – could write in their plurality opinion 
in Casey (1992) that the function of the Supreme Court was to resolve basic 
conflicts and the function of the public at large was to accept the Court,41 in 
its own words going back to Cooper v. Aaron (1958), as the “ultimate 
interpreter” of the Constitution.42  To adopt the language from my 
book Constitutional Faith, the Court presented a “catholic” (note the little-c) 
 
34. Id. 
35. Alexander M. Bickel, Toward a Theory of Politics, THE JOURNAL OF 
POLITICS, Feb. 1985 at 126–27. 
36. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (ending 
the doctrine of “separate but equal” de jure segregation). 
37. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 333 (1962).  
38. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 564–65 (1964). 
39. BALKIN, supra note 2, at ch. 7. 
40. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (identifying a woman’s right to choose 
an abortion as a fundamental right); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
(identifying privacy in marital relations as a fundamental right). 
41. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J. and Souter, J. attended Harvard Law School, O’Connor, J. attended 
Stanford Law School). 
42. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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view of itself as the equivalent of the Vatican so far as the Constitution was 
concerned.43 
Today, almost no one takes seriously this self-presentation of the Court, 
not least because its present majority is truly Catholic – a reality almost 
literally inconceivable when I was in graduate school many decades ago, 
having just experienced John Kennedy’s reassuring of a Baptist audience in 
Houston that his religion was irrelevant to understanding him as a person or 
political leader (which, perhaps, was empirically correct).44  And the Catholic 
identity of certain justices is not deemed a mere factoid, similar to having been 
born, as Ruth Ginsburg was, in Brooklyn,45 but, rather, genuinely constitutive 
of how the judges in question look at the world, especially and most obviously 
with regard to such “culture-war” issues as abortion and the willingness to 
include non-heterosexuals as full members of the American constitutional 
community.  Justice Antonin Scalia “broke the fourth wall,” as it were, in his 
angry Obergefell dissent when he explicitly noted that the Court did not 
include a single justice who might be said to represent the strong Evangelical 
Protestant strain in American society and politics.46  (Indeed, most analysts 
attribute the strength of the Trump coalition to the resentment by this group at 
their relative exclusion from elite consideration.)  If one gives even a scintilla 
of credence to Scalia’s complaint, then it is at least as fair to note that, for 
many, the absence of Evangelical justices was more than made up for by the 
dominating presence of strongly Catholic justices.   
But it would be a mistake to reduce the current majority to their religious 
identities.  They are also strongly Republican (capital R), fully committed to 
the general worldview that was associated at least with the pre-Trump 
Republican Party.  As Jack well notes, every Republican appointee since 
David Souter – partly as a reaction to the Republican disappointment about 
Souter’s subsequent career on the Court – has been a strong, “movement” 
conservative Republican, especially, the Federalist Society- and Heritage 
Foundation-vetted Neil Gorsuch,  Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett, 
 
43. SANDFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 29 (Princeton Univ. Press 
1988). 
44. John F. Kennedy, Presidential Candidate, Address to the Greater Hous. 
Ministerial Ass’n (Sept. 12, 1960) (transcript available at 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16920600 
[https://perma.cc/QZV2-P6EW]). 
45. Biography of Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographyginsburg.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/6QTG-CV7F] (last visited Jan. 29, 2021). 
46. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 717–18 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Not a single evangelical Christian (a group that comprises about one quarter of 
Americans), or even a Protestant of any denomination.”). 
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added to the Court with unseemly haste just before the election.47  And it is 
fair to say that Biden, should he have the opportunity, will be strongly 
expected to pick, at least as a successor to the retiring Breyer, strong liberals 
who might well receive votes only from Democrats, and unanimous 
opposition from Republicans.  The Georgia results make it reasonably likely 
that Biden will be able to replace Justice Breyer if he behaves responsibly and 
announces his retirement, subject to the confirmation of a successor, no later 
than the end of the current Term of Court.48  The ruthless dismissal of Merrick 
Garland’s nomination by Mitch McConnell may simply become a precedent 
for all Supreme Court appointments in the contemporary political world.49 
The contemporary Court, like the contemporary legal profession and, of 
course, the country at large, is very much divided into different ideological 
teams.  This is what “polarization,” a major theme of the book, is all 
about.50  Devoted partisans of their respective teams believe their opponents 
are “heretics,” willfully rejecting the obviously true doctrines, whether of 
“originalism” or “living constitutionalism,” in favor of trying to impose their 
narrow “political” objectives.  This is to assume the sharp separation of law 
and politics that Jack rightly ridicules.  Instead, I think it is fair to say that, 
like Mark Tushnet in his own recent book, Taking Back the 
 
47. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 120; Lawrence Hurley, Trump’s Supreme Court 
appointee Gorsuch plots rightward course, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-gorsuch/trumps-supreme-court-
appointee-gorsuch-plots-rightward-course-idUSKBN1EE0IJ 
[https://perma.cc/M53H-LZEK]; Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Justice Kavanaugh upbeat in 
first major public speech, REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2019), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-kavanaugh/u-s-justice-kavanaugh-
upbeat-in-first-major-public-speech-idUSKBN1XO2WI [https://perma.cc/ZU6N-
ZSTB]; Andrew Chung, Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Supreme Court nominee Barrett has 




48. Rich McKay, Nathan Layne, Georgia delivers Senate to Democrats with 
Warnock, Ossoff wins, REUTERS (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-election-georgia/georgia-delivers-senate-to-democrats-with-warnock-ossoff-
wins-idUSKBN29B173 [https://perma.cc/8QH9-CG3V].  Needless to say (for readers 
of this essay), Justice Breyer has resolutely rejected the numerous calls for his 
resignation and gives every indication that, like Ginsburg before him, he prefers to 
roll the dice as to whether in fact Mitch McConnell returns to his role as majority 
leader of the Senate in the 2022 mid-term elections.   
49. Lawrence Hurley, Supreme Court nominee out in cold as election heats up, 
REUTERS (July 19, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-
garland/supreme-court-nominee-out-in-cold-as-election-heats-up-idUSKCN0ZZ17L 
[https://perma.cc/LNG7-WN7R]. 
50. See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 112. 
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Constitution,51 Jack does not view Republican judges as “heretics,” but, 
instead, as skilled professionals who happen to have an unfortunate, albeit 
plausible, view of what the Constitution (or statutory interpretation) means.52   
To describe Chief Justice Roberts and his Republican cohort, as I 
sometimes have done in conversation, as “running dogs of the capitalist 
empire,” is for better or worse to suggest that they are self-consciously asking 
what they can do to enhance the powers of capital against, say, consumers 
injured by corporate malfeasance.  However, it is probably more accurate to 
say simply that they have incorporated into their understanding of what is best 
for America – and the “true meaning” of the Constitution – Republican 
nostrums about the glories of the so-called “free market” and concomitant 
notions of what it means to “secure the blessings of liberty” at the present 
time.  No justices, at either end of the current ideological spectrum, need be 
viewed as “insincere” in their beliefs about what fidelity to their constitutional 
oath entails. And nothing is gained by traducing any of them, as Justice Scalia 
was sometimes prone to do, as not “behaving like judges” because they come 
to different conclusions as to what the Constitution requires.  But such 
“civility” toward one’s opponents scarcely resolves the political and 
jurisprudential dilemmas that Jack limns.  
In fact, one of the surprising features of the book is his modification of 
one of the most important of our co-authored essays, a 2001 article in 
the Virginia Law Review in which we tried to explain how “constitutional 
revolutions” operate.53  In that essay, we proffered the distinction between 
“high politics” and “low politics.”54  We suggested, as had, for example, Felix 
Frankfurter in an essay in the International Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences in the 1930s, that all judges (and lawyers), without exception, 
carried in their heads conceptions of what sorts of policies or approaches to 
law would in fact best serve “the public good.”55  They would, not 
surprisingly, always interpret any ambiguous laws in ways that would best 
achieve the results dictated by “high politics.”  It would be extraordinary if 
they did anything else.  Why would anyone expect or want them to do so?  
Perhaps, on occasion, the harsh demands of the text alone would remove any 
grounds for claiming ambiguity, so that conscientious judges would 
reluctantly be forced to enforce something that they viewed as at least stupid 
and even out-and-out evil.  But cases, especially that reach the Supreme Court, 
 
51. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING BACK THE CONSTITUTION, (Yale Univ. Press, 
2020). 
52. See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 70–74. 
53. See J. M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional 
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1064–65 (2001). 
54. Id. at 1061–62. 
55. Id. at 1068; Felix Frankfurter, Advisory Opinions in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
SOC. SCI. 475–78 (Edwin R. A. Seligman et al. eds., 1930). 
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rarely feature truly unambiguous text, and one would expect “high politics” 
to play a prominent explanatory role in the decisions actually reached by given 
justices. 
On the other hand, “low politics” was concern for what would serve the 
interests of a judge’s political party or political associates in the next 
election.  We suggested that “low politics” was rarely present at the level of 
the Supreme Court, though this probably was not true if one looked at local 
courts in Chicago, Louisiana, or some other state courts.56  Jack now suggests, 
however, that the distinction might have outlived its use-by date, precisely 
because it is getting ever more difficult to separate the two realms.57  When 
Chief Justice John Roberts, for example, systematically votes to uphold what 
Democrats have no trouble defining as “voter suppression” efforts by, say, 
Alabama (Shelby County) or declares that ruthless partisan gerrymanders are 
non-justiciable (Rucho), is he manifesting a “high” political vision or instead 
serving as an agent of the GOP that placed him in office to do whatever he 
can to maintain them in power through thick and thin?  This does not require 
that he be consciously thinking of what will serve GOP interests, only that he 
is, from “our” point of view, recklessly indifferent to the consequences for the 
American polity of adopting his readings of the Constitution, because, overall, 
they best fit what we formerly would have described as (only) his “high 
politics.”   
But the crucial problem, as Jack spells out, is that an older generation, 
influenced by footnote four of Carolene Products and culminating in John 
Hart Ely’s 1980 Democracy and Distrust, accepted wide-ranging decision-
making powers on the part of legislatures and even executives in return for a 
promise that the Court would monitor the procedures by which officials were 
selected.58  One should be expected to be a “good loser” in the ordinary 
political process if, in fact, the process was demonstrably fair (or at least fair 
enough) to avoid being described, in contemporary parlance, as “rigged.”  But 
recent decisions on campaign finance, gerrymandering, and voter suppression 
have removed any reason to believe that the American electoral system in fact 
meets standards of fairness.  Perhaps the most truly regrettable reality of the 
immediate political scene is the baseless charge by a near-sociopathic former 
president that he did not in fact lose the election, and, even more so, the 
willingness of Republican officials who should know better, including 
Missouri’s own senators, to humor him and refuse to acknowledge the 
completely legitimate coming-to-power of Joseph Biden as the forty-sixth 
 
56. See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 1061–62. 
57. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 125–26. 
58. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53, n. 4 (1938); 
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75–77 
(Harvard Univ. Press, 1980). 
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president.59  One can only shudder at what the current polity would look like 
if 2020 emulated 2000 in having the election come down to an almost literal 
handful of votes in Florida.60  We have been spared that, but it is clear beyond 
argument that Donald J. Trump is no Al Gore, who was willing to offer an 
immediate concession after the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore and 
who, even during the hiatus between election day and December 12, never 
denounced the election as a whole as being simply a “rigged” enterprise.61  
But no one should believe that the American system of elections is necessarily 
defensible under twenty-first century notions of democratic theory.  The 
problem is that much of the most important “rigging” took place in 1787.   
So there is much of Jack’s analysis that I thoroughly agree with.  Where 
we diverge, however, is that I deeply wish, more than ever, that his diagnosis 
of our “constitutional rot” had included more attention to the Constitution 
itself.  Might it be part of the rot, as against the potential cure?  For me, that 
has become a rhetorical question.  Whether or not I would emulate William 
Lloyd Garrison in burning the Constitution, I have certainly stopped 
venerating it and almost desperately wish that we had a culture willing to 
engage in what Hamilton, in Federalist No. 1, termed “reflection and choice” 
about the adequacy of the 1787 document.62  Jack often writes eloquently of 
“redeeming” the promises of the Constitution, as set out, most surely, in a 
Preamble that should indeed continue to speak to us today.63  But for me, 
“redemption” of those promises requires a wholesale revision of what comes 
after the Preamble, which may serve to make effectively impossible the 
realization of the aspirations to, say, “establish justice” or achieve “general 
welfare.”  
The closest Jack comes to recognizing this possibility is near the very 
end of the book, when he acknowledges that the United States Senate is 
organized in such a way that it places what has become the core Democratic 
 
59. Jason Lange, Republican senator says he will challenge Biden victory in 
Congress, REUTERS (Dec. 30, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-
senate/republican-senator-says-he-will-challenge-biden-victory-in-congress-
idUSKBN29424P; Biden sworn in as U.S. President, REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2021), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biden-inauguration-oath/biden-sworn-in-as-
u-s-president-idUSKBN29P2A3 [https://perma.cc/M63E-H7UU]. 
60. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100–01 (2000). 
61. Id.; Mario Parker & Colin Keatinge, Trump Pulls Back From Concession, 
Tweets Vote Was ‘Rigged’, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2020), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-15/trump-tweets-that-biden-
won-election-says-vote-was-rigged [https://perma.cc/VV37-5FT9]. 
62. Ronald Osborn, William Lloyd Garrison and the United States Constitution: 
The Political Evolution of an American Radical, 24 J. L. & Religion 65, 83 (2009); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton). 
63. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 6. 
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constituency at a decided disadvantage.64  This means that we may face a 
future of “only modest, slow change, which will often be frustrating.”65  
“Obstacles” like the Senate “will make it harder to chip away at the causes of 
constitutional rot.”66  Well, yes.  And for me this portends further tragedy and 
the ever-growing and fully justified disillusionment with the political system 
foisted on us in 1787.  As Erin Delaney noted in her own very acute remarks, 
within the lifetime of all but the oldest readers of this symposium, 
approximately seventy percent of the population will be living in no more than 
fifteen states.67  This means, thanks to the Constitution’s text, that the thirty 
percent living in the remaining thirty-five states (assuming no new states) will 
have seventy percent of the votes in the Senate, while the overwhelming 
majority of Americans will have to settle for a thirty percent share.  And there 
is nothing random about the distribution of populations as between the large 
and smaller population states.  The Senate more and more serves as an 
affirmative action program for older, whiter, more religious, less 
cosmopolitan, and, of course, rural Americans.   
People are literally dying, or faced with the prospect of miserable 
futures, in part because of the obvious problems with the American political 
system.  At what point will enough people consider what is happening to them 
a sufficiently “long train of abuses” that they will not simply wait for the 
happy ending that Jack promises?  This is most certainly not to say that I can 
envision a more plausible comedic ending.  
One can understand the pull toward comic rather than tragic endings.  
Four Threats: The Recurring Crises of American Democracy, by Suzanne 
Mettler and Robert Lieberman, an often brilliant analysis of our current dire 
situation, also concludes with some hopeful reassurance that all is not lost.68  It 
is certainly reassuring, and even true, to be reminded that “we survived the 
great pandemic of 1918-1919, various depressions, and two world wars in the 
 
64. Id. 
65. Erin Delaney, Professor of Law, Northwestern University Pritzker School of 
Law, Panel One: Constitutional Design at the Missouri Law Review Symposium: A 
New Hope? An Interdisciplinary Reflection on the Constitution, Politics, and 
Polarization in Jack Balkin’s “The Cycles of Constitutional Time” (Nov. 12, 2020), 
https://law.missouri.edu/faculty/symposia/2020-missouri-law-review-symposium/ 
[https://perma.cc/3CTD-ZXEN]. 
66. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 165.   
67. Erin Delaney, Professor of Law, Northwestern University Pritzker School of 
Law, Panel One: Constitutional Design at the Missouri Law Review Symposium: A 
New Hope? An Interdisciplinary Reflection on the Constitution, Politics, and 
Polarization in Jack Balkin’s “The Cycles of Constitutional Time” (Nov. 12, 2020), 
https://law.missouri.edu/faculty/symposia/2020-missouri-law-review-symposium/ 
[https://perma.cc/3CTD-ZXEN]. 
68. SUZANNE METTLER & ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN, FOUR THREATS: THE 
RECURRING CRISES OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (St. Martin’s Press, 2020). 
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20th century,” not to mention a civil war that killed 750,000 persons and 
blighted the lives of millions of others.69  So  this, too, will pass.  The sky is 
not really falling or, even if one might be wary at the present moment, it will 
stop, and our descendants will be able to sing, “Happy Days are Here 
Again.”  I can only say, I hope so, but at this moment I continue to look up at 
the sky with trepidation.  I am inclined to believe Edgar, from Act IV of King 
Lear: “The worst is not / So long as we can say ‘This is the worst.’”70 
 
69. Id. 
70. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF KING LEAR Act IV, Sc.I. 
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